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In his most intriguing and challenging contribution Christopher
Tindale addresses one crucial point of van Eemeren and Houtlossers
strategic maneuvering project. It is the question whether rhetoric can
be rational only as being subordinated to dialectic or, rather, it can be
regarded as having its own rationality. His central claim, on which I
shall concentrate in what follows, is exposed in the third part of Tin-
dales essay (Part III: The Rational Core of Rhetoric), where he denies
that rhetoric needs dialectic to provide reasonableness. Rhetoric, so he
says, can be considered as ‘‘being reasonable on its own terms’’.
This claim is framed by Tindale in a view of rhetoric that he
describes as essentially dialogical. As he emphasizes, any argumenta-
tion move involves both the arguer and the audience insofar as the
audiences expectations, interpretations and responses condition the
development of the argument. ‘‘Understanding argumentation, includ-
ing the intentions involved, must begin as much with the audience as
the arguer’’ (Part II: Rhetorical Argumentation as a Cooperative
Venture: Multiple Maneuvering; 2.1. Rhetoric and Dialectic). This
statement applies equally to the reasonableness of argumentation. In
particular, whether an argument is convincing and thus reasonable de-
pends on the universal audience. Tindale adopts Perelman and Ol-
brechts-Tytecas concept here with certain modiﬁcations by relating it
more explicitly than these authors to an empirical or ‘‘immediate’’
audience: ‘‘What the concept of the universal audience allows us to do
is to keep our focus on the immediate audience with its particular cog-
nitive claims, while recognizing a standard of reasonableness which
should envelop that audience, and which it should acknowledge when-
ever recourse to the universal audience is required’’ (Part III: The
Rational Core of Rhetoric).
Now, however, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecas concept of the uni-
versal audience had been already criticized by van Eemeren and
Grootendorst (1995) for being relativistic. Reasonableness, so the
authors, would become relative, given that each particular audience –
out of which the universal audience is developed – could assume its
own standards of reasonableness. As Tindale demonstrates in the cen-
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tral part of his argument, the problem is not solved but only shifted, if
universal audience is explained as a construct of the arguer because
‘‘now there will be as many deﬁnitions of reasonableness as there are
arguers’’ (Part III: The Rational Core of Rhetoric). To that point,
however, Tindale opposes two arguments. First, he indicates that (i)
this criticism again ‘‘favours the perspective of the arguer [...] and
overlooks the role of the actual audience’’ involved in his dialogic
model of argumentation. As he writes, ‘‘it is not a matter of each ar-
guer deciding the universal audience in some arbitrary way, such that
there are as many universal audiences as there are arguers. It is a mat-
ter of the argumentative situation determining the limits on how the
universal audience can be conceived in that case, and the respondent
or particular audience playing a co-authoring role in that decision’’
(Part III: The Rational Core of Rhetoric). Furthermore, he argues
that (ii) ‘‘reasonableness arises from the practices of actual reasoners,
it is not an abstract code independent of them that they consult for
corroboration’’ (Part III: The Rational Core of Rhetoric). In sum,
‘‘argumentation grows out of audience, develops according to the
demands of and interaction with a (ﬂuid) audience, and is measured
by a further audience, the universal audience in each situation’’
(4. Conclusion ).
While I can clearly see and admit the advantage of emphasising the
role of the audience for sharpening and developing arguments, I am
still reluctant to accept the view of rhetoric as ‘‘being reasonable on its
own terms,’’ if that means that argumentation is measured exclusively
by the audience. Before one admits that the proper fundament of the
reasonableness of rhetoric is the reasonableness of the audience, sev-
eral other points have to be clariﬁed. First of all, the question arises
whether the universal audience is the measure of reasonableness eo
ipso in each situation. Or does it perform this function only in some
situations, while in others not? This question leads immediately to
another one, that is, how do the cognitive claims of an audience relate
to other standards of reasonability such as, for example, the principle
of non-contradiction? Are the former universal in the same way as the
latter?
What lurks behind the afoire-going questions is the suggestion that,
by emphasizing the importance of the audience, Professor Tindale
defends a weak concept of reasonableness. As I am going to argue,
there is nothing to object against Tindales assumption, quoted above,
that reasonableness arises from the practices of actual reasoners. How-
ever, this assumption does not help to ward oﬀ the justiﬁable criticism
advanced by van Eemeren and Grootendorst, according to which
reasonableness is a relativistic concept.
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In order to clarify my point, I am going ﬁrst to distinguish between
two diﬀerent concepts of reasonableness: a strong and a weak one.
Drawing upon this distinction, I shall further demonstrate in what
sense Tindale refers to a weak concept, whereas the pragma-dialectic
approach applies a strong concept of reasonableness. This clariﬁcation
should help us, ﬁnally, to understand to what extent rhetoric might be
considered as reasonable on its own terms.
If one departs from the colloquial use of the word ‘‘reasonable’’ or
‘‘rational’’,1 one notices immediately that this term can encompass
several diﬀerent things depending on the objective area to which it is
applied: deliberation, opinions, or arguments may be candidates for
reasonableness within the cognitive area; actions within the behavioral
area; and desires within the emotional area. When we call discourses,
arguments, or thoughts reasonable, we are referring to them neither as
to linguistic constructs nor as regards the respective content of their
declarative statements (technically speaking, the proposition or the
propositional subject matter). Such a content is either true or false,
but not reasonable or unreasonable. Rather, by using the expression
‘‘reasonable’’ we are describing opinions in a much broader sense. In
the following, ‘‘opinion’’ should be understood as a proposition held
to be true. Holding a proposition to be true includes believing, expect-
ing, supposing something, being convinced of something, considering its
possibility, etc. So, holding an opinion is a relation between a subject
(S) and a proposition (P), which can be formalized as ‘‘S is of the
opinion that p...’’. To be exact, one has to add: S is of the opinion p
at a certain point in time or during a certain period of time (t), i.e. ‘‘S
is of the opinion p at time t.’’
A further insight into the meaning of the word ‘‘reasonable’’ can be
gained by looking at its opposite. In contrast with simple descriptive
words, the expression ‘‘unreasonable’’ possess a normative component
in our cultural context. To say that someone is behaving unreasonably
means not only to suggest that a certain statement or action of the
subject has the named characteristic. It also usually includes a negative
evaluation or criticism of such a statement or action, since standards
of reasonability are not fulﬁlled. These standards may be rendered
brieﬂy by the keyword ‘‘well-founded’’: opinions, actions, etc. are rea-
sonable when they can be justiﬁed via reasons. Hence it is obvious
that the meaning of ‘‘reasonable’’ is relative: opinions are defended
relative to the argumentation standards possessed by the subject S in
relation to the respective facts at the time t. And we could even add,
following Tindale, that those standards of the subject are not isolated
from a certain audience, but rather for the most part adapted from it.
Whenever relative arguments are present, we can speak of ‘‘reason-
ableness’’ in a weak sense. In contrast, a ‘‘strong’’ concept of
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rationality requires that the criteria to which one refers in the process
of the relative substantiation of opinions and actions can themselves
be proved as reasonable. The strong concept of reasonableness lays
thus claim to universality: it implies that certain standards of substan-
tiation can be justiﬁed independently of any audience. Regarding argu-
ments, this would mean that there are norms, goals, or values which
can be justiﬁed independently of a given speciﬁc audience which is
being addressed.
At this point it seems necessary to introduce another distinction not
always suﬃciently addressed in the discussion of the relative validity of
rationality. Whether or not it is reasonable to have opinion p depends
on two conditions: on the one hand, on the respective cognitive condi-
tion; on the other hand, on the rules of rationality. By cognitive con-
dition, I mean the whole set of accepted opinions, convictions,
evidences, and goals possessed by a certain person at a certain period
in time in front of a speciﬁc audience. This cognitive state must be dis-
tinguished from the rules of rationality. To be sure, both of them go
hand in hand at every stage of reasoning. Even so, they can always be
disentangled as its separate components.
Reasonableness is relative, ﬁrst of all, with regard to the respective
cognitive initial state. Secondly, it is relative with regard to certain
rules or standards of theoretical reasonableness. Discussing the prob-
lem of reasonableness and its relativity, then, one has to be aware of
the kind of relativity being referred to. The relativity regarding the
respective cognitive initial state seems not only unproblematic, but it is
even inevitable. The second type of relativity is diﬀerent, though, in
that it regards the rules of reasonableness. In so doing, it raises the
question whether or not one can ﬁnd such rules applicable to all audi-
ences and, if so, which ones. A major problem of the relativistic view
of reasonableness is that the expressions ‘‘reasonable’’ and ‘‘substanti-
ated’’ lose their normal meaning. According to this view, ‘‘reasonable’’
is nothing more than ‘‘substantiated’’ for a certain person or a group
of persons; in other words, for a speciﬁc audience. For the so-called
‘‘relativists’’, the rules of reasonableness are exclusively dependent on
the particular audience or context; they allow no context-independent
judgment. As a result, any claim to universality is denied. Therefore, a
relativist will maintain that standards of rationality are completely
arbitrary and cannot be justiﬁed by reasons which go beyond the
speciﬁc audience.
Where does the distinction between cognitive claims and rules of
rationality and the related distinction between weak and strong sense
of reasonableness lead us regarding Christopher Tindales claim that
rhetoric is reasonable on its own terms? From what has been said so
far it follows that we might indeed admit reasonableness of rhetoric in
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a weak sense. Such a reasonableness would be founded upon the rea-
sonableness of the audience, which corresponds exactly to its speciﬁc
cognitive claims. I readily agree with Tindale that the speciﬁc cognitive
claims of the audience have to be taken into account in any argumen-
tation move. But I cannot see why and how this point could ward oﬀ
the criticism according to which reasonableness of rhetoric, taken only
in this weak sense, would be anything else than relativistic.
NOTE
1 As Christopher Tindale, I also treat here reasonable and rational as synonyms.
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